USAWC STRATEGIC RESEARCH PROJECT
The views expressed in this paper are those ofthe author and donot necessarily reflect theviews of the Department of Defense orany of itsagencies. This document may not be released foropenpublication until it has been cleared bythe appropriate militaryservice or governuenagency.
THE NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY OF 1864,WHO WAS THE AurHOR?
AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT
by
Lieutenant Colonel Burton W. TulkkiUnited States Army
Dr. Jay LuvaasProject Advisor
U.S. Army War CollegeCarlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013
April 22, 1994S~Aceesion For
NTIS CRA&IDTIC TAB
DSTRiBUTION STATEMENT A: UnannouncedApproved for publicrelease;distribution is unlimited. Justification................
By.. ......Disti ibution I
Availability Codes
Avail arid orDist Special
SI Form ApprovedREPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE OMB No. 0704-0188
`UbIK reportn burden for this colleCtOn of information 1estimated to average I hour per response. imncluding the time forreviewing instructions. searching extstrig data sowrces,gatheringand mitaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing thecolle"ion of information $end comments regarding this burdenestimate or any other asect of thiscoakllKion of information.,nclding suggestions For reduci•ng thu urden to WashingtonHeadauarters Services. Direcorate r information Operations andReports. 121S Jefferson
Davis Highway. Suite 1204. Arington. VA 222024302. and to theOffice of Management and Budget. Paperwork Reduction Project(0704-01M). Washington. DC 20S03.
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPEAND DATES COVERED
I 22 April 1994 Study Project4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE S. FUNDINGNUMBERS a
The National Military Strategy of 1864, Who Was theAuthor?
6. AUTHOR(S)
TULKKI, Burton W., LTC
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) B. PERFORMINGORGANIZATIONREPORT NUMBER
U.S. Army War CollegeRoot Hall, Bldg 122CarlisleBarracksCarlisle, PA 17013-5050
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10.SPONSORING/MONITORINGAGENCY REPORT NUMBER
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
12a. DISTRIBUTION/ AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTIONCODE
Approved for public release;distribution is unlimited.
13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words)
This paper looks at the National Military Strategy of 1864 whichsuccessfullybrought an end to the Civil War. It asks the questionwho was the author? TheNational Military Strategy of 1864 wasformulated at a meeting in Cincinnati, Ohioin March of 1864 but norecords exist. Two generals, U.S. Grant and W.T. Shermanareexamined as the most likely candidates. The paper looks at eachgeneral'sexperience, personality, and relationship with each other.It explains each man'sstrategic concepts and what contribution hemade to the strategy formulation.
The paper concludes that the successful strategy of 1864 was aresult of thesynergism of the two men's ideas on how to win thewar. It was a masterful blendof their best ideas and itaccommodated each mans personal strengths. It waspossible becauseof an extraordinary relationship and bond between the two men.Thisrelationship not only led to a successful strategy but alsomasterful execu-tion that doomed the Confederacy.
14. SUBJECT TERMS 15. NUMBER OF PAGES
16. PRICE CODE
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 19.SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACTOF REPORT OF THISPAGE OF ABSTRACT
Unclassified Unclassified Unclassified ULNSN 7540-01-280-5500Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)
Pre94 bed by ANSSI Std Z39-8
9 5 ý 5296-102
ABSTRACT
AUTHOR: Burton W. Tulkki, LTC, USA
TITLE: The National Military Strategy of 1864, Who WastheAuthor?
FORMAT: Individual Study Project
DATE: 22 Apr 94 PAGES: 30 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified
This paper looks at the National Military Strategy of 1864whichsuccessfully brought an end to the Civil War. It asks thequestionwho was the author? The National Military Strategy of1864 wasformulated at a meeting in Cincinnati, Ohio in March of1864 but norecords exist. Two generals, U.S. Grant and W.T.Sherman areexamined as the most likely candidates. The paperlooks at eachgeneral's experience, personality, and relationshipwith each other.It explains each man'sstrategic concepts andwhat contribution hemade to the strategy formulation.
The paper concludes that the successful strategy of 1864 wasaresult of the synergism of the two men's ideas on how to winthewar. It was a masterful blend of their best ideas anditaccommodated each mans personal strengths. It was possiblebecauseof an extraordinary relationship and bond between the twomen. Thisrelationship not only le~d to a successful strategybut alsomasterful execution that doomed the Confederacy.
ii
The National Military Strategy of 1864,Who Was the Author?
Introduction
The early spring of 1964 was a watershed time for the Union.
The North had won important victories at Gettysburg and at
Vicksburg in the summer of 1863 and at Chattanooga in late1863.
It was now time to go on a great offensive to defeat theSouth
and end the war.
President Abraham Lincoln nominated General U.S. Grant for
the rank of Lieutenant General and to command all armies ofthe
United States. On 4 March Grant went to Washington, D.C. totalk
to Lincoln, be promoted and to discuss his new duties. Grant
returned to the West on 10 March to complete his unfinished
business. He named General William Tec*mseth Sherman tosucceed
him as commander of the Military Division of Mississippi.
On 18 March Sherman assumed command in Nashville, Tennessee
and immediately accompanied Grant on his journey East as faras
Cincinnati, Ohio. He did this, as he wrote in his memoirs,"to
avail myself the opportunity to discuss privately manylittle
details incident to the contemplated changes, and of the
preparation for the great events then impending."' Grant and
Sherman were together often between 18 and 24 March whenSherman
left for Nashville and Grant to the East.
There is no official record of the meeting. Many have
speculated but all we know for sure is that out of themeeting
came the National Military Strategy for 1864. This strategywas
implemented in the spring and led to the defeat of theSouth.
Who was the author of the strategy, Grant, Sherman or both?
Which had the major influence? It was the product of an
extraordinary synergism between Grant and Sherman. Each cameto
the meeting with strong views, some of them complementaryand
others which were opposing. What resulted was a strategy
developed by both men that adapted the ideas of each. They
agreed on the final strategy, embraced it and executed it toend
the war. It was a masterpiece, flexible enough to capitalizeon
the strength of each general. ýt was cemented by their
extraordinary and unquestioning friendship and respect foreach
other.
The Meeting
The meeting in Cincinnati was one of the most important
meetings of the war.
In the parlor of the Burnet House in Cincinnati, bendingovermaps, the two generals, who had so long beeninseparable planedtogether .... the great campaigns ofRichmond and Atlanta ..... and,grasping one another firmly bythe hand, separated, one to the East,the other to tha West,each to strike at the same instant, his halfof theponderous deathblow.'
Neither general wrote about the meeting, a surprising fact
in that both were prolific writers and wrote often to fellow
generals, to friends and to family. Sherman wrote religiouslyto
his brother, Senator John Sherman, often expressing hisfeelings
and thoughts on important events. Both saved their lettersand
2
they survive today in their memoirs and other publications.But
there is no record of the meeting. Grant wrote letters from
Nashville on the 15th, 16th, 17th and made a speech on the18th.
But there is no recorded letter between the 18th and 24th of
March, the time of the travel to and the actual meetings in
Cincinnati. Sherman apparently also wrote no letters duringthis
period.
Results of these meetings are pieced together only by
looking at later letters that start to give implementation
instructions. Grant wrote General Henry Halleck, The Chiefof
Staff of the Union Army, on 30 March saying, "All veteransshould
report to the command to which they belong except whenspecially
ordered otherwise--all recruits and new organizations fromOhio
and states east of it, I would advise, ordered to assembleat
Washington and those from states west of Ohio to berendezvoused
at Louisville.'I3 He notified Generals Don Carlos Butler and
Nathaniel Banks, two of his army commanders, on 2 April tostart
coordination of the impending offensive. 4 Grant wrote Shermanon
4 April outlining all orders he had sent to Butler, Banks,and
General Franz Sigel concerning the spring offensive. "But allI
can now direct is that you get ready as soon as possible." 5
Sherman's letter answering Grant of 10 April outlines his
preparation and implementation of the plan saying, "Your two
letters of April 4 are now before me, and afford me infinite
satisfaction." 6
There is no record of the meeting, no recorded thoughts.
3
Sherman was satisfied with his instructions. He wrote Granton
10 April 1864, "We are now all to act on a common plan,
converging on a common center, looks like enlightened war." 7The
campaign was set and the Union Armies were moving. Thequestion
remains. Who was the most influential player at thismeeting?
Some keys to the answer are found looking at the twoplayers.
Sherman's Character
William Tec*mseth Sherman was a man of definite views of
right and wrong and saw very little gray in between. He was
focused, practical, systematic, detail oriented, and reliedon
his experiences. He was firm, logical and organized. Sherman
was an adaptive flexible planner who liked schedules. Heclearly
saw the big picture and analyzed and understood complex
situations.
It is interesting to speculate what Sherman's personality
preference was using the Myers-Briggs methodology. Shermanfits
an ESTJ profile. He was an extrovert who relied on sensing,
thinking and judgment over intuition, feeling andperceptions.
This personality type is good at analysis, holds consistentlyto
a policy, weighs the law of evidence, and stands firmagainst
opposition. He can be prone to emotional outbursts or showof
anger and can take criticism personally. 8 There are many
examples of this type behavior in Sherman's career. One ishis
hostility against the press. Commenting on his reaction totheir
4
criticism to his failed attack at Vicksburg, Sherman wrote
Admiral Porter on 1 February 1983:
The Northern press, stimulated by parties here, havesownbroadcast over our country the most malicious chargesandinsinuations against me personally, in consequence of myfailureto reduce Vicksburg. I have some friends that will,I know, be sadlytroubled by these reports. 9
Sherman's personality was strong but he also had weaknesses.
An ESTJ is frustrated by complications and can misunderstand
others values. An ESTJ has little interest in mercy or
conciliation and is stubborn and judgmental.'" Thispersonality
preference is inflexible, a trait not found in Sherman. He
exhibits this ESTJ thinking in his view on how to treat
southerners, covered later in this paper. He also shows itin
his discontent with politicians, politics and thecomplicated
political process, not always logical or just. Hisflexibility
in the conduct of campaigns such as Atlanta shows he had mostbut
not every trait common to an ESTJ.
Sherman s Experience
After graduation from West Point in 1840, his early military
career, though marked by dedicated service to the country,wa-
not distinguished. He left the army in 1853 and was involvedin
banking, law and education. At the eve of the Civil War hewas
out of the army and though not a failure, was not entirely
successful in any of his life's pursuit. His early military
service in the Civil War did much to shape his future
"5
philosophies of campaigning and war.
Sherman was cited for bravery and leadership at First Bull
Run. He was a division commander under Grant's command atthe
battle of Shiloh, forming the right wing of Grant's line.Grant
relates, "a number of attacks were made by the enemy to turnthe
right flank, where Sherman was poised, but every effort was
repulsed with heavy loss.""n Sherman learned importantlessons
at this battle. The problems associated with a frontalattack
were made clear. This was an important event that helpedcement
the Sherman-Grant relationship, a relationship very importantin
the formulation of the strategy of 1864.
Sherman's Thoughts
Sherman was thinking on the strategic level as early as
See AlsoThe Rise And Fall Of Wichita Falls' Busted NewspaperSpringfield Weekly Republican from Springfield, Massachusetts1861. On 22 April he wrote his brother, "the question of the
national integrity and slavery should be kept distinct, for
otherwise it will gradually become a war of extermination,--a
war without end." He went on to offer his assessment on the
strength of Washington and other garrisons along the east
coast. 12 In letters of May 1861 he wrote about the importanceof
keeping the border states of Kentucky, Tennessee and Arkansasand
the importance of the Mississippi River as the great problemof
the Civil War. 1 3 At this early point in the war Shermanwas
already thinking about Grand Strategy.
Sherman's concept of strategy was cemented in his mind
6
during the Vicksburg Campaign. After slugging it out withthe
Confederate Army for many mow°hs, Vicksburg fell only afterthe
Union Army cut away from -he supply line and cut theConfederate
lifeline. Liddell Hart in his biography Sherman writes:
The camoa..gn revealed to him, more clearly than anyotherpreviou' experience, that strategy is not merely aforerunnerbut the master of tactics, that the purpose ofstrategy is tominimize fighting and that it fulfills thispurpose by playing onthe minds of the opponent, so as todisturb him to upset his balanceof mind. The campaignrevealed to him also that in warunexpectedness and mobilityare the master-keys of generalship---opening many doorswhich no physical weight can force --- and itdemonstrated,in particular, the incalculable value of deception andofcutting loose from communications.14
Sherman showed he was a strategic thinker. He thought atthis
level before the war and early in the war as a brigadecommander.
He continued to grasp strategic concepts at everyopportunity.
Sherman learned by what he observed and came to the meetingwith
Grant well prepared. He was one of the Union Generals who
understood strategic thinking.
Sherman and Total War
Sherman brought to the meeting a definite view on how to
fight a war. His time as a banker in San Francisco and histime
as a lawyer gave him insights to what was important to the
people. He understood that a nation's army derived itsstrength
and support from the people. He understood the importance ofthe
well being of the people for them to believe in the cause andto
fight for it.
7
Sherman believed that resisting power of a modern democracy
depends more on the popular will then on the strength of the
armies. This popular will often depends on economic andsocial
security."s Thus, Sherman believed in taking war to thepeople.
Sherman legitimized this concept by rationalizing the
immoral aspects. Sherman was extremely patriotic and had avery
strong idea of right and wrong. In his view the South had
seceded from the Union and had given up all rights as citizensof
the United States. He reasoned, based on their choice of
succession, that Southerners were not protected under thelaws
and were subject to his total war theories. He believed thatlaw
and war were opposite states. War began when law broke down."6
The South had declared war. It was subject to all the
consequences of total war until conquered and it came back tothe
Union. He was unbending on this belief and conducted his
campaigns accordingly.
Sherman's Military Strategy
Sherman's Military Strategy is not written down in any
document but can be postulated through examination of his
writings.
The South is defeated when its people are defeated.
Control the Mississippi River and the West. It is the
Key to the War.
Coordinate and squeeze the Confederacy on all fronts.
8
Geography is important and a key to controlling and
defeating the enemy.
Use War of Movement.
Use Defensive Tactics, avoid Frontal Attacks.
Sherman's belief in total war has already been documented.
He had other strong views. His fixation on the West isclearly
seen in his early letters to his brother and in his letterto
Grant. In a letter to Grant on 10 March 1864 he urges him:
Come out West and take to yourself the Mississippi Valley;let usmake it dead-sure, and I tell you the Atlantic slopeand Pacificshores will follow its destiny as sure as thelimbs of a tree liveor die with the main trunk! Here liesthe seat of the empire andfrom the West, when our task isdone, we will make short work ofCharleston and Richmond,and the impoverished coast of theAtlantic."7
Sherman had learned his lesson at Shiloh and Vicksburg about
direct assault. He believed in movement. General D.S.Stanley,
one of his subordinates, wrote, "General Sherman never foughta
battle, though he had a thousand chances. Partial affairscalled
battles were fought, but it was always with a fragment ofhis
army. He never had the moral courage to order his whole army
into an engagement." 18
This observation was correct but not fair. Sherman had seen
the failures of frontal attacks at Shiloh and Vicksburg andwas
determined, if allowed time, to achieve the desired resultswith
others means. Maneuver warfare was not common in the CivilWar
and not universally accepted. General Stanley's statementshould
be taken as factual observation and evidence of Sherman's
9
advanced ideas on warfare. He developed it over time throughhis
observations and was ahead of his time. Sherman came to the
meeting with developed views and ready to discuss them with
3rant.
Grant on Sherman
It is helpful to see how General U.S. Grant viewed Sherman.
It provides insights not only about Sherman but also intoGrant's
character. It provides a study of both men. Much is written
about how the two successfully fought battles together inthe
West and worked together in 1864 and 1865 to defeat theSouth.
The difference in opinion Grant had with Sherman during the
Vicksburg Campaign shows an interesting insight of these twomen.
Sherman opposed Grant's Vicksburg Strategy. He wanted to goback
to Mf-.iphis and attack Vicksburg overland from the north.Grant
wanted to strike off into enemy territory away from hissupply
lines and attack Vicksburg from the south. He was willing to
spend time in difficult maneuver to continue the attack.Sherman
was so animate in his views he wanted the corps commandersto
vote on their preference between the two proposals."9
Grant would not for reasons other than military take any
course of action that looked like a step backwards. After
Vicksburg was taken using Grant's approach, he chidedSherman.
In what is today called an after report of he wrote:
Some of our generals failed because they worked outeverything byrules. They knew what Frederick did at one
10
place and Napoleon at another. They are always thinkingaboutwhat Napoleon would do. Unfortunately for their plans,the rebelswould be thinking about something else. I don'tunderstate the valueof military knowledge but if men makewar in slavish observance ofrules they will fail ..... EvenNapoleon showed that; for myimpression is that his firstsuccess came because he made war in hisown way, and not inimitation of others. 20
Grant differed from Sherman on what he considered as the key
to defeating the enemy. "Every army should move against the
enemy."'21 He was influenced greatly by Sherman but also by
others such as his chief of staff, John Rawlins. Rawlins
understood the political realities of protecting Washington,D.C.
and convinced Grant to come to the East over the advice of
Sherman.
Additionally, Grant was not as fixed on holding territory as
Sherman. He saw the defeat of the army--not holdingterritory--
as the key to winning a war. As he began his campaign of 1864he
felt it was a waste to use too many men in the border states.22
He needed them to defeat the enemy.
Grant did not support Total War as strongly as Sherman.
Sherman wrote General Halleck on 17 September 1863 givinghim
what amounted to a regional assessment. In this assessmenthe
was very blunt about the social classes of the South andwhat
should be done once the war was over and reconstructionbegan.
He said that the South chose war and had very few rights.
Sherman went on to give an evaluation of the classes in theSouth
recommending which were useful to reconstruction efforts and
which were not. He even goes as far as recommending oneclass,
represented by Stewart John Morgan, Forrest, and Jackson, be
11
killed. He ends by saying power and might are much more
effective in ruling belligerent people and keeping them inline
than any political means. 2"
Sherman provided Grant a copy of this letter. Grant wrote
Halleck on 19 September commenting, "I think we should do it
(Sherman's strategy) with terms held out, that by accepting,they
could receive the protection of our laws." 24 Grant did not
believe that Southern people had forever given up theirrights
until defeated and was much more conciliatory, maybetempered
more by politics, than Sherman. Grant came to the meetiA .with
similarly strong views. Examining him points out why he held
these views. It explains why he operated so well withSherman.
Grant's Personality
Grant's personality preference fits an INTP. He was an
introvert who used intuition and perception along withobjective
thought. He, like Sherman, relied on thinking and judgmentover
feeling but, unlike Sherman, was more introverted and used
intuition over sensing. As he noted in what is now theVicksburg
after action report sometimes one had to do what he sensedwas
right. This characteristic made him look at possibilities,not
just facts. He could prepare for the future and watch fornew
opportunities. This type person- lity is a visionary, beingan
architect of systems or strategies. He can push organizationsto
understand the system as a whole with interaction amongparts
12
This clearly describes Grant. But, this personality also
has shortcomings. The consequence of this personalitypreference
is the tendency to overindulge in sensory pursuits, such as
drinking in excess."
Grant's Experience
Important experiences prior to 1863 shaped U.S.Grant. Like
Sherman he graduated from West Point but unlike Sherman foughtin
the Mexican War. In this war he obtained the first insightinto
political military control. He saw General Scott send a very
popular General Taylor out of Mexico to neutralize him.Taylor
was a Whig, the opposition party, and a Presidential threatto
the current administration. 26
He resigned from the army and like Sherman had an
undistinguished civilian career. His opportunity came whenwar
broke out. He soon had a series of successes in the western
theater. The capture of Forts Henry and Donelson, Shiloh,
Vicksburg and Chattanooga all added to his reputation.
More importantly he learned from each battle. J.F.C. Fuller
talks about these lessons in his book The Generalship ofUlysses
S. Grant. He says Grant learned to push forward ammunitionat
Donelson, the value of a general reserve at Shiloh, and at
Vicksburg the value of sticking with a well thought-outplan.
Observing the raid of Confederate Van Dorn around HollySprings,
Mississippi, taught him the advantage off living of theland.2"
13
Grant's Thoughts
Grant's experiences led to the development of his strategic
thinking. He had a good mind and was a methodical thinker.Like
Sherman, he was good at analytical thought and came up withsound
decisions. Fuller writes about Grant's ability to see thingsof
strategic importance:
When at Cairo in 1861 he saw the importance of Paducah,after thecapture of Donelson he saw the importance of theMississippi whichlead to the Vicksburg Campaign. He sawquite clearly thatChattanooga was the back door toVirginia, Mobile the side door toGeorgia, and that once inFederal hands a Confederate force atChattanooga wasthreatened in the rear and a Federal force advancingfromthis town south would have its right flank and then itsrearprotected. 2"
Grant came to his meeting with a wealth of experiences andsound
strategic ideas on how to win the war. He was the newly
appointed Commander and Chief, ready to make decisions to winthe
War.
Grant's Military Strategy
Going into the Meeting, a credible strategy for Grant would
be.
Conquer Armies, It is more important than Territory.
The Confederacy Must be Divided East and West.
Conduct all operations in concert.
14
Keep the Confederacy From Using Interior Lines.
Move Directly on the Enemy.
Grant's letter of 15 March supports his strategy. He wrote
it prior to his meetings with Sherman and shows histhinking.
Grant writes:
I have not yet fully determined upon a plan of campaign forthisSpring but will do so before the return of our veterantroops to thefield. It will however be my desire to haveall parts of the Army,or rather all the Armies, act as muchin concert as possible. Iwould not, at present, advise theabandonment of any portion ofterritory now held, west ofthe Mississippi, but commence no movefor the furtheracquisition of territory, unless it be to make thatnow oursmore easily held. I look upon the conquering oftheorganized armies of the enemy as being of vastly moreimportancethan the mere acquisition of their territory. Itmay be a part ofthe plan for the Spring Campaign to moveagainst Mobile. There isone thing General I would urge,and do not know but you have alreadyadopted, and that is ofsupplying your army, as far as possible,from the occupied.Mules, horses, forage and provisions can be paidfor, wheretaken from the persons who have taken the amnestyoathprescribed by the President, if the oath be taken beforetheloss of property, with both economy and convenience. 2 9
Grant's strategy is summarized up by a comment by Fuller,
"His own idea was to operate against Lee's communicationsand
once he cut them, make use of them in order to operateagainst
Lee's rear.... it is clear that Lee's rear was hisobjective."30
Grant was set in his mind on how to fight the war going intothe
meeting.
General Howard on Both Generals
General Oliver 0. Howard introduces the difference in the
two generals' views about strategy in his observations upon
15
coming West. He wrote:
It was evident, and did not grow from likeness butunlikeness.They appeared the complements of each other.Where one was strongthe other one weak. Grant was reticentwho liked meditations andmatured plans. He liked tosystematize and simplify always bringingsufficient forces.He liked to do unexpected things using promptoffensives tofollow the victory. He was best at campaign andbattle.Sherman was quick brilliant with a topographical sense.Hewas extremely patriotic. He was impaired by violentconflict andwas best at campaign.
This is a very revealing comment about the two men from ageneral
who served under them. It is a first hand account andsupports
their strong relationship and their complementarypersonalities.
Grant/Sherman Personal Relationship
The final aspect to examine is the personal relationship of
the two generals. This played an important part in the
determination of the final National Military Strategy of1864.
This relationship was solid and a result of many episodes overa
long period. Sherman and Grant overlapped for several yearsat
West Point with Sherman the senior cadet. They met in 1853
outside St. Louis when both were trying to make a go ofcivilian
life.
They did not cross paths during the Civil War until Sherman
was a training and logistics officer in Paducah, Kentuckydoing
everything he could to support Grant in his campaign againstFt
Donelson. At that time, Sherman was senior to Grant, but itwas
said that Sherman's willingness to waive rank won Grant'sheart
and was the beginning of a friendship like that of David and
16
Jonathan in the Bible." This relationship developed and
prospered from then on through Shiloh, Vicksburg, and
Chattanooga.
Sherman defended Grant to the newspapers and to the
politicians in Washington, through his brother, when he was
attacked after Shiloh for excessive casualties. Sherman also
praised Grant often and thought him a great General. Theletter
he wrote Grant on 10 March 1984 best exemplifies this truly
strong relationship. Sherman told Grant:
Your strongest feature was "simple faith in success" whenyoucomplete your preparation you go into battle withouthesitation ....no doubt no reserve; and it is that this makesme act in confidenceI knew that wherever I was that youthought of me, and if I got in atight place you would come- if alive. 33
They were also able to talk to each other candidly. In that
same letter Sherman congratulates Grant on being namedcommander
and chief of all Union Armies and writes, "my only doubts wereas
to your knowledge of grand strategy and it books of scienceand
history: but I confess your common sense seems to havesupplied
all this."3 4
Grant was not the only beneficiary of this relationship.
Grant gave Sherman his second chance after, in December of1861,
he was declared crazy by the newspapers and thought unfit to
command by Halleck. Grant gave Sherman a division command, a
corps command, and ultimately an army group command.
Sherman needed Grant, large and generous, incapable of being
disturbed by little ebullitions of impatience and arrogance,who
brought out Sherman's pure patriotism and splendid military
17
genus.
Macarther writes in 6rant and His Generals, "Grant was
charmed, interested, and fascinated by Sherman. Shermanrelied
confidently in the strength and judgment of Grant." 36 Thesetwo
generals shared a relationship stronger than maybe any otherin
the Civil War.
The two generals were compatible. Their personalities were
similar in most aspects except one was intuitive, the othermore
reliant on facts. They had similar military training and
experiences and both had tasted civilian life. Bothexperienced
early success in the war but both came under criticism bythe
press for their failures. They had many common beliefs. But
above all they had the utmost trust and loyalty in eachother.
The total respect for each other resulted in little criticismof
each other privately or publicly. This makes it verydifficult
to determine who was the actual author of the Strategy of1864.
Each man's refusal to take credit also makes it moredifficult.
We may never know who was the driving force of the meeting butit
is not important. What is important is the result.
The National Military Strategy of 1864
Grant and Sherman completed their meetings on 24 March.
Each had brought his ideas to the table. They bothinfluenced
each other and the strategy evolved. Grant supports this inhis
15 March letter to Banks. Sherman writes General McPherson on14
18
March, "I don't know as yet the grand strategy of the next
campaign, but on arrival at Nashville, I will catch the main
points and will advise you of them." 37
Clearly the strategy was formulated at the meetings in
Cincinnati. Grant finalized it in the following days. Grant
best describes the final strategy in a letter to Sherman on4
April 1863. Summarizing this letter Grant directs:
General Banks in New Orleans to withdraw troops from
Texas, except the Rio Grand area, hold the Mississippi River
with minimum required troops, collect soldiers from Missouri
and commence operations against Mobile, Alabama.
General Butler at Norfolk will join forces with General
Gillmore and commence operations against Richmond going up
the south side of the James River.
General Sigel collects all available fo ces and
commences operations against the Virginia and Tennessee
Railroad that is in the Shenandoah Valley.
General Sherman moves against Johnson's army, staging
out of Chattanooga, breaking it up and moving to get into
the interior of the enemy as far as possible. He is to
inflict all the damage he can against their war resources.
Grant stays with General Meade and the Army of the
Potomac reenforced by General Burnside and operates against
Lee's Army wherever it is found. 3"
This National Military Strategy took affect in the spring of
1864. The map on the next page depicts it graphically.
19
I I VRGNI
MtRD I 33OURI
KETUKYINmvf~, IPA
MAPNO.9-RAN'S TRTEGCA MA WO HS 164CAMPAIG
A A W Ata A 3 T E N E 3 V,
TEWh Wa Responsible?-- -
There re sevral bsic teants o the IlNArySrtg
of~~~~--- 1864.33 It isdifiut o etrinewowsth uhr
hypothesis can bke pooe adarspniiit sine oecelement.* Th baieleent of thi strtegadtei
conribto were:% 116
mA N.9-RN~ rAxocL APPR n18420PAG
Coordinated Operations Both
Prohibit Confederate Use of Interior Lines Both
Divide the Confederacy East and West Grant
Cut Important Railroads Both
Defeat the Enemy's Armies Grant
Defeat the Confederacyis Ability to Make War Sherman
Supply the Army off the Land Both
The strategy was the result of the combining of Grant's and
Sherman's strong views. The two men, being very much alike,did
not spend much time on agreement at the margins. They wereon
the same wavelength, and reinforced each other. A few
differences existed but they were accommodated. Several ofthe
elements held important by both and became cornerstones ofthe
campaign of 1864. It was flexible enough to allow eachgeneral
to fight his type of campaign.
Coordination of the armies was a belief by both men and not
a great item of discussion. In their letters bothacknowledged
the absolute importance on keeping the two armies apart. The
prior experience of both allowed them to see its greatvalue.
Both understood the importance of denying the Confederacy theuse
of interior lines. It was a major reason for the coordinated
offensive. Both saw the result at Chickamauga, when Lee had
detached Longstreet's Corps from Virginia to fight in theWest.
They saw no dire consequences on Lee's forces because ofUnion
inactivity. Cutting the railroad was an objective thatsupported
the prohibition of Confederate interior lines and acceptedby
21
both.
Grant was the advocate of splitting the Confederacy East and
West, probably not at the Mississippi River but closer tothe
eastern mountains. Sherman, on the other hand, alwayssupported
control of the Mississippi River and looked at control ofthe
West as a key to victory. By this time Vicksburg was takenand
the Mississippi River was controlled. Grant wanted to drivea
wedge into the Confederacy with Johnson's army as anobjective.
He did not look upon control of territory as critical. Thefocus
on the enemy armies was Grant. He saw the need to defeat Leein
the East and Johnson in the West. These were clearly the
objectives of the campaign. Sherman was the advocate for the
destruction of the Confederacy's ability to wage war. Thiswas
his total war concept. This was his strong conviction. He
thought it terrible but just. Without Sherman, it would nothave
existed in the National Military Strategy. Grant toleratedit
but did not totally embrace it. Grant did not have thatelement
in his own strategy but recognized its value and accommodatedit
in a more politically feasible manner.
Examining what Grant writes on Total War over time is very
interesting Initially he was totally against it. Over time,
perhaps because of his experiences and association withSherman,
he modified his position. On 16 February 1862, Grant issued
General Field Orders Number 16. " Pillaging andappropriating
public property is positively prohibited and officers are
particularly enjoined to see the enforcement of this order." 4'
22
On 26 March 1862 Grant wrote to Sherman cautioning him on
his operations:
General Meeks reports to me that the party sent to bringincotton in addition to executi-ig what they were there for,carriedoff three mules and a horse, also set fire to one ofhis houses.Some of the men put out the fire before muchinjury was done.However, our men must learn not to exceedtheir orders. The horseand mules must be returned, and theofficers in charge of the partyarrested and tried, orreprimanded, if guilty, according to thedegree of guilt. 4'
Later Grant wrote to Sherman:
I do not calculate upon the possibility of supplying theArmywith full rations from Grand Gulf. I know it will beimpossiblewithout constructing additional roads. What I doexpect however isto get what rations of hard bread, coffeeand salt we can and makethe country furnish the balance. 42
In his 14 March letter to Banks he mentions that he should
supply his army of the land. But he makes sure he impressesupon
him to pay for it as long as stipulations are adhered to.
Grant's final opinion on the subject is shown in his General
Order of 30 April 1964:
SIR: The following instructions, which will not beprinted, arefurnished by order of the Secretary of War foryour information andguidance, and are to be sent by you toofficers under your 'cmmand,to whoma they will apply:
I. Generals commanding armies and army corps in thefield willtake proper measures to supply, so far as may bepossible, the wantsof their troops in animals andprovisions from the territory throughwhich militaryoperations are conducted. Private property so takenwill bereceipted and accounted for in accordance withexistingorders. Special care will be taken to remove horses,mules.live-stock, and all means of transportation fromhostiledistricts infested by guerrilla bands of rebels.
II. Commanding officers will establish properregulations inaccordance with usages and customs of war forenforcement of thisorder. 43
Grant was for controlled forage but never publicly approvedtotal
war.
23
Sherman's major influence to the strategy was Total War.
Grant treated Sherman differently on this subject than hisother
generals, perhaps because it was Sherman's concept. Grant
understood it and was confident Sherman would execute it.This
was new to warfare at that time and a unique element to the
strategy.
It is interesting to see that in his implementing
instructions Grant gives all other generals only a military
objective. He gives Sherman a military and an economic
objective. Additionally Grant writes to Sherman, "I will not
propose to lay down on you a campaign, but simply to lay downthe
work it is desirable to have done and leave you free to
execute. ,,44
It cannot be said Sherman was the only influence on Grant.
Grant was his own man. Catton supports this in his bookGrant
Takes Command. Catton relates that Grant told his intimates,"he
would not take over this new command if it meant buryinghimself
in the Capitol, and that he originally planned to establish
himself in Chattanooga and go with Thomas' Army on a driveto
Atlanta.",4' The Strategy coming out of the meeting was
influenced by subsequent discussions with others. Grant had
discussions with Generals McPherson, Grenville Dodge, Logan,
Rawlins, and Sheridan. Rawlins is attributed in convincingGrant
that he must stay East, meet and conquer Lee and fight thefinal
duel. He considered this correct militarily and politically
important. 46 Sherman may not have gotten command of theWestern
24
Armies if others had not influenced Grant to go East. But,
clearly Sherman was a major influence with Grant in the Springof
1864.
What Led to Success
This strategy was set primarily by the two generals.
Sherman's major contribution was his idea of taking war tothe
people and defeating the enemy by defeating the people.Grant's
major contribution was coordinated efforts moving directly onthe
enemy and defeating the armies. On the surface this appears
disjointed. Why did it succeed?
The success was the strategy being general enough to allow
independent operations and actions by the two generals andtheir
armies. In the East Grant was able to move on the enemy andstay
engaged with Lee until its final surrender. Sherman was ableto
strike at Atlanta in a war of movement and conquer territoryand
defeat the will of the people. Sherman actually never wentafter
the western army. It stayed intact until after Leesurrendered.
Instead he kept up his end of the agreement made at Cincinnatiby
keeping the Confederate western army occupied reacting tohis
successes conquering territory.
Which tenant of the strategy was most important in winning
the war? Many believe Sherman's total war concept was.Sherman
in his letters writes about a conversation with Grant's son.He
25
writes:
Fred Grant told me that in his later days his father wasmore andmore recognizant of truth that I had been his mostloyal friendthroughout his military career, that hismemoirs now in hand of hispublishers will have evidence tothat effect, and therein hedistinctly gives me entirecredit for the conception and executionof the March to theSea--and that more importantly campaigns throughtheCarolinas."
Grant, while following his strong belief of the importance
of defeating Lee's Army used some of Sherman's total war. He
allowed General Phil Sheridan, one of his theater commanders,to
execute total war during his Shenandoah operations. Heburned
the countryside to preclude this breadbasket region from
supplying Lee's Army to the south. Sherman was extremely
successful executing the strategy. At one point there were
people who proposed making him equal or even a superior toGrant.
He would have none of this. This is more proof of theirloyalty
and friendship that created great synergism which lead to
success.
Conclusion
The March Strategy set by Sherman and Grant set the course
of the war and lead to Victory. Grant as Commander and Chiefof
all Armies logically was very influential. General Sherman,
almost a brother to Grant, was also influential at themeetings.
He convinced Grant that total war was important. Grant
recognized it but directed it and tried to control it in amore
palatable form. The strategy was sound. It had the best
26
thoughts of these two men. It allowed independent actionsand
flexibility. It put the South in a death grip. NeitherGrant's
nor Sherman's strategy alone may have worked as well. It may
never happen again where two men discuss, agree, disagree,
compromise, and put together a plan so successful.
27
Endnotes
1.W. T. Sherman, Memoirs of General W.T. Sherman (NewYork!Literary Classics of the United States Inc., 1990), 463.
2.Richard Wheeler, We Knew William Tec*mseth Sherman (NewYork:Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1977), 62.
3.Ulysses S. Grant, The Papers of Ulysses S. Grant(Carbondale:Southern Illinois University Press, 1967), volume10, 240.
4.Ibid., 245-247.
5.Ibid., 252.
6.Sherman, 491-492.
7.Ibid., 491.
8.Sandra Krebs Hirsh and Jean M. Kummerow, Introduction toTypein Organizations (Palo Alto: Consulting PsychologistsPress,Inc.,1990), 10.
9.0fficial Records of the Union and Confederate Navies inthe Warof the Rebellion, (Washington D.C.: Government PrintingOffice,1911), vol. 24, 216-217.
10.Hirsh and Kummerow, 19.
11.Wheeler, 35.
12.Rachel S. Thorndike, The Sherman Letters:Correspondencebetween General and Senator Sherman from 1837 to 1891(New York:Charles Scribner's Sons 1894), 113-14.
13.Ibid., 120-121.
14.Liddell B. Hart, Sherman (New York: Frederick A.Praeger,1958), 428.
15.Ibid., 426.
16.Ibid.
17.Sherman, 428-429.
29
18.Edward C. Macarther, Grant and His Generals (New York:
The McBride Company, Inc., 1953), 290.
19.Ibid., 280-281.
20.Ibid., 281-282.
21.Bruce Catton, Grant Takes Command (Boston: Little, BrownandCompany, 1968), 138.
22.Ibid.
23.Sherman, 360-367.
24.Grant, volume 9, 221-222.
25.Hirsh and Kummerow, 9-11, 13, 28.
26.J.F.C. Fuller, The Generalship f Ulysses S. Grant (NewYork:Da Capo Press, Inc. 1858), 71.
27.Ibid., 187-188.
28.J.F.C. Fuller, Grant & Lee (Bloomington:IndianaUniversity Press, 1982), 256-2S7.
29.Grant, volume 10, 220-221.
30.Fuller, Grant & Lee, 257.
31.Macarther, 284-285.
32.Wheeler, 26.
33.Hart, 28.
34.Ibid.
35.Ibid., 26.
36.Macarther, 292.
37.Sherman, 433-434
38.Ibid., 490.
39.Fuller, Grant & Lee, map no. 9.
40.Grant, Volume 4, 219-220.
41.Ibid., 426.
30
42.Ibid., volume 8, 183.
43.The War of the Rebellion-A Compilation of the OfficialRecordsof the Union and Confederate Armies, (Washington D.C.:GovernmentPrinting Office, 1980), Series III, vol. 5, 250.
44.Hart, 232.
45.Canton, 132-133.
46.Macarther, 290.
47.Sherman, 343.
A
31
Bibliography
Catton, Bruce. Grant Takes Command. Boston: Little, BrownandCompany, 1968.
Fuller, J.F.C., Grant & Lee. Bloomington: IndianaUniversityPress, 1982.
The Generalship Of Ulysses S. Grant. New York: Da CapoPress,1958.
Grant, Ulysses S. The Papers of Ulysses S. Grant.Carbondale:Southern Illinois University Press, 1967.
Hart, Liddell B. Sherman. New York: Frederick A. Praeger,1958.
Hirsh, Sandra Krebs and Jean M. Kummerow. Introduction to TypeinOrganizations. Palo Alto: Consulting Psychologists Press,Inc.,1990.
Macarther, Clarence Edward. Grant and His Generals. New York:TheMcBride Company, Inc., 1953.
Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in theWarof the Rebellion. Washington D.C.: Government Printing
Office, 1911.
Sherman, William T. Home Letters of General Sherman. NewYork:Scriber's Sons, 1909.
Memoirs of General W.T. Sherman. Washington: TheLibrary OfCongress. 1875, 1886. Reprinted, New York: LiteraryClassics of theUnited States, Inc., 1990.
The War of the Rebellion-A Compilation of the Official Recordsofthe Union and Confederate Armies. Washington D.C.:GovernmentPrinting Office, 1880.
Thorndike, Rachel S. The Sherman Letters: CorrespondanceBetweenGeneral and Senator Sherman from 1837 to 1891. NewYork:Charles Scribner's Sons, 1894.
Walters, John B. Merchant of Terror. New York: TheBoobs-MerrilCompany, Inc., 1973.
Wheeler, Richard. We Knew William Tec*mseth Sherman. NewYork:Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1977.
33
FAQs
What personality type is ESTJ? ›
ESTJ (Executive) is a personality type with the Extraverted, Observant, Thinking, and Judging traits. They possess great fortitude, emphatically following their own sensible judgment. They often serve as a stabilizing force among others, able to offer solid direction amid adversity.
What is an ESTJ personality leader? ›The ESTJ type is one of the 16 personality types identified by MBTI. It stands for Extraversion, Sensing, Thinking, and Judging. Common traits of the ESTJ leadership type include sociability, practicality, logical decision-making, and a preference for structure.
What personality type is most in the military? ›ISTJ, ESTJ, ENTJ, and INTJ account for roughly 78 percent of middle grade to flag rank officers in the United States military. All of these personality types include thinking and judging (TJ). These four types, however, make up only 30 percent of the general population.
What are the strategic thinking competencies of the Army? ›Strategic thinking is a capability needed in organizations to anticipate needed change (e.g., Sackett et al., 2016). Sackett et al. (2016) described six strategic thinking competencies: comprehensive information gathering, learning, critical thinking, innovative thinking, thinking in time, and systems thinking.
Does ESTJ have anger issues? ›Common misinterpretations of their attitude make ESTJs appear confrontational or aggressive when they want to talk it out and move on. But when an ESTJ feels defeated or disrespected, they are quicker to react to anger, even if they want to pull away and keep the peace.
What is an ESTJ attracted to? ›Attraction to Softness and Gentleness
We, as Executives, are known for our command and control. We value order and hierarchy. But beneath this seemingly hard exterior, there's a surprising appreciation for softness and gentleness.
ESTJs represent approximately 8.7 percent of the U.S. population.
What do ESTJ people like? ›People with ESTJ preferences are logical, organized, and results driven. They love managing projects and teams. They tend to be highly structured and dependable, even in their personal lives. ESTJs are great at networking, organizing the right people for a job, and making tough decisions confidently and tactfully.
What is the love style of an ESTJ? ›ESTJs and love
ESTJs tend to do best when they can exert some control over day-to-day details to show their partner that they care. ESTJs are always working to make their relationships better, which often results in them being attentive and dedicated partners.
Assertive Debaters (ENTP-A) were the most likely of all personality types to say they don't shy away from physical fights (59%). Debaters love to challenge others, test limits, and push boundaries.
Which personality type is the deepest? ›
It's this intense empathy that pushes INFJs to the top of the sensitivity list — they are often deep thinkers like INFPs, and are also incredibly attuned to the needs of the people around them. INFJs are highly sensitive to the words and deeds of those close to them.
Which personality is the hardest to type? ›INFJs are incredibly difficult to type, or determine our MBTI personality type, because we are natural chameleons. We blend in with our environment and take on the personalities of the people around us.
What is an example of strategic thinking competency? ›Strategic thinkers know how to use data to generate new insights about how they and their organizations make money. Examining patterns of performance over time (financial, operational, customer, and competitive data) will reveal critical information about future opportunities and risks.
What are examples of strategic competence? ›Strategic competence strives for the fluency and efficacy of communication by overcoming the language gap. This is in regard to audience and purpose. An example of this would be asking for clarification on a term one does not understand.
What are the three main strategic planning competencies? ›Strategic planning activities typically focus on three areas: business, corporate or functional. They break out as follows: Business. A business-centric strategic plan focuses on the competitive aspects of the organization -- creating competitive advantages and opportunities for growth.
Is ESTJ a rare personality type? ›ESTJs represent approximately 8.7 percent of the U.S. population.
What is the rarest personality type? ›1. INFJ. INFJ, also known as the advocate, counselor, or idealist, is the rarest type of personality in the general population.
Who is ESTJ compatible with? ›- ISFP. ISFPs provide a balance to the ESTJ's commanding nature with their sensitive, creative, and adaptable qualities. ...
- ISTJ. ISTJs are a natural match for ESTJs due to their shared commitment to duty, responsibility, and organization. ...
- ISTP. ...
- ENFJ, ENFP.